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UNITED STATES v. BENKAHLA: ILLUSTRATING THE NEED FOR
REFORM—THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S UNPRECEDENTED
APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT TO AN
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE CONVICTION
STEVEN A. BOOK*
In United States v. Benkahla,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether Sabri Benkahla, who was convicted
of obstructing grand jury and FBI investigations concerning terrorists and
terrorist groups, qualified for the obstruction of justice terrorism
enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline Manual
Section 3A1.4, Application Note 2.2 At Benkahla‘s sentencing, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Benkahla qualified for
the terrorism enhancement despite the absence of case law with respect to
the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement3 and even though the
effect of the enhancement was ―unequivocally severe.‖4 The district court
even declared, ―Sabri Benkahla is not a terrorist.‖5 Nonetheless, the court
applied Section 3A1.4, which subjected Benkahla to an advisory sentence
range of 210 to 262 months, after finding that the government‘s
investigation in the case targeted specific terrorism offenses and that
Benkahla‘s false statements actually obstructed that investigation.6

Copyright © 2009 by Steven A. Book.
* Steven A. Book is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law
where he is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author is very grateful to Professor
Sherri Lee Keene for her guidance and invaluable knowledge of United States sentencing
jurisprudence. The author would also like to thank Heather R. Pruger for her patience and
insightful feedback, as well as the entire staff of the Maryland Law Review. Lastly, the author
owes a special thanks to Hannah Kon for her tremendous effort and unfailing encouragement
throughout the writing process.
1. 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).
2. Id. at 303, 305–06.
3. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756, 757 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff‟d, 530 F.3d
300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).
4. Id. at 751.
5. Id. at 759.
6. Id. at 757; see infra Part II.
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Although the district court ultimately decided to downward depart7
and place Benkahla within a Guideline range of 121 to 151 months,8 its
analysis, which the Fourth Circuit endorsed, is disconcerting because it
significantly eases the government‘s burden to prove that obstruction of
justice convictions warrant the application of the terrorism enhancement.9
Based on the Fourth Circuit‘s deferral to the district court opinion,
defendants who are not convicted of crimes that directly involve terrorism
and are unaware that their testimony is obstructing a terrorism investigation
can receive a sentence of up to 262 months of imprisonment.10 In this case,
there is a shocking disparity between the 33- to 41-month advisory
sentencing range Benkahla would have received for a non-terrorism-related
obstruction offense and the 210- to 262-month sentencing range imposed
for obstructing an investigation into a federal crime of terrorism.11 The
Fourth Circuit‘s overzealous use of Section 3A1.4, Note 2 in Benkahla
indicates that the United States Sentencing Commission needs to reevaluate
the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement.12
I. THE CASE
On the orders of the FBI, Sabri Benkahla, a 27-year-old master‘s
degree recipient from Falls Church, Virginia,13 was arrested in Saudi
Arabia in 2003, where he had been studying Islamic law and traveling with
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a member of the terrorist group al Qaeda.14
Benkahla was detained by the United States government for a month15
before he learned that he had been linked to a ―Virginia jihad network‖ of
young Muslim American men who played paintball in the Virginia

7. In the federal sentencing guidelines, a ―downward departure‖ refers to ―a court's
imposition of a sentence more lenient than the standard guidelines propose.‖ BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY 496 (8th ed. 2004). United States Sentencing Guideline § 4A1.3 provides that a
court may downward depart ―[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal
history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or
the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.‖ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 4A1.3 (2008).
8. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
9. See infra Part IV.A.
10. See infra Part IV.A–B.
11. See infra Part IV.C.
12. See infra Part IV.A–C.
13. Jenny Cuffe, US Muslims „Alienated by Patriot Act,‟ BBC NEWS, July 4, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file_on_4/5145970.stm.
14. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950
(2009).
15. Cuffe, supra note 13.
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countryside as a means of training for violent jihad overseas.16 A federal
grand jury subsequently indicted Benkahla and charged him with ―willfully
supplying or attempting to supply services to the Taliban, in violation of 50
U.S.C. § 1705,‖ and with using a firearm in furtherance of that offense in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).17 According to the charges, Benkahla fired
an automatic AK-47 rifle and rocket propelled grenades while at a training
camp in Afghanistan operated by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani terrorist
group, in the summer of 1999.18 Although provision of services to
Lashkar-e-Taiba was not criminalized at that time, provision of services to
the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban violated the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.19
In March 2004, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia acquitted Benkahla of all
charges after finding that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he provided services to the Taliban or to the Taliban-controlled
territory of Afghanistan.20 After his acquittal, Benkahla was subpoenaed
and compelled to testify before a federal grand jury in August 2004
regarding his participation in jihad training camps and combat in
Afghanistan or Pakistan in the summer of 1999.21 The government also
questioned Benkahla about individuals he knew who participated in such
camps22 and several militants associated with the Dar al-Arqam Islamic
Center, an organization in Falls Church, Virginia.23 Throughout the
investigation, Benkahla denied participating in training relevant to violent
jihad or knowing anything about the persons who facilitated such training.24
16. Jerry Markon, Man Indicted Again in Terror Probe; Defendant Was Acquitted in
„Virginia Jihad Network‟ Trial, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, at B4.
17. United States v. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff‟d, 530 F.3d 300
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). Benkahla was indicted with ten other
individuals who were linked to the ―Virginia jihad network,‖ but his case was eventually severed
because, unlike the other ten defendants, Benkahla was not charged with ―conspiracy . . . to
engage in armed hostilities against the United States . . . [and] tak[ing] part in military expeditions
against nations with which the United States was at peace.‖ Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 303–04.
18. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
19. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 13129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36759 (July 7, 1999)).
20. Id. at 545–46. Judge Brinkema believed that Benkahla attended a jihadist camp
somewhere, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan, and fired a weapon while there, but ultimately
determined there was insufficient evidence to establish that Benkahla‘s combat training activities
occurred within the Taliban-controlled region of Afghanistan. Id. at 546.
21. Id. at 544. Benkahla testified before the grand jury a second time on November 16, 2004,
id. at 545, and also met with the FBI several times in ancillary proceedings, Benkahla, 530 F.3d at
304. He was granted statutory immunity for truthful testimony. Id.
22. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 547–49.
23. See United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d,
530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).
24. Benkahla, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 544–45.
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On February 9, 2006, Benkahla was indicted for making false
declarations to the grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623, obstructing
justice on account of false declarations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503,
and making false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a).25 On February 5, 2007, a jury convicted Benkahla on all
counts.26
At Benkahla‘s sentencing, the government argued that Benkahla
qualified for a sentencing enhancement pursuant to Section 3A1.4,
Application Note 2 of the United States Sentencing Guideline Manual.27
The Eastern District of Virginia observed that Section 3A1.4 prescribes
substantial sentencing increases when the offense for which a defendant has
been convicted involved or was intended to promote (1) an ―investigation of
a federal crime of terrorism‖ and (2) obstruction of that investigation.28 The
court noted at the outset that ―[t]he guidelines provide no guidance as to
what constitutes ‗an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism‘ or
‗obstructing‘ within the meaning of this seemingly broad enhancement.‖29
In the absence of such guidance, the district court first concluded that
an investigation is only an ―investigation of a federal crime of terrorism‖
within the meaning of Section 3A1.4 if it seeks specific information
regarding particular terrorism offenses.30 Without such specificity, the
court reasoned, the terrorism enhancement cannot apply to an obstruction of
justice conviction.31 Because the government pointed to specific facts and
circumstances of its ongoing investigation,32 the court held that Benkahla‘s
false testimony satisfied the terrorism enhancement‘s ―motivational
element‖—namely, that the testimony was ―calculated to influence or affect
the conduct of [the United States] government.‖33 Significantly, the district
25. Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 305. During the jury trial, the government‘s expert witness
provided ample background testimony on terrorism and violent jihad worldwide, and an FBI agent
working on Benkahla‘s case also testified on the subject. Id.
26. Id. Although the jury convicted Benkahla on all counts, it acquitted him of certain
particular allegations in its special verdict form. Id.
27. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
28. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
29. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007)).
30. Id. at 754.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 756. Specifically, the court found that the government met its burden of proof by
demonstrating that the investigation sought information on al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba
affiliates, and that those persons were being investigated for potential commissions of crimes
within the ―enumerated offenses‖ of 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). Id.
33. Id. at 754–56. The district court explained that this ―motivational element‖ derives from
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), which defines ―‗federal crime of terrorism‘‖ as ―‗an offense that—(A) is
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to
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court found that Benkahla‘s obstruction met this motivational requirement
even though it did ―not believe [Benkahla] had the willful intent to promote
an act of terrorism.‖34 The court thereby ascertained that the investigation
in Benkahla‘s case constituted an ―investigation of a federal crime of
terrorism‖ as contemplated by Section 3A1.4.35
Second, the district court explained that Section 3A1.4 requires a
showing of actual obstruction.36 In its analysis of this requirement, the
court observed that ―[i]n the same investigation in which [Benkahla] was
questioned, eight individuals to whom he was connected went to foreign
jihad training camps and one was convicted of soliciting treason to fight
against the United States.‖37 The court also recognized that, at the time the
FBI and grand juries questioned Benkahla, two leaders of Dar al-Arqam
had not yet been indicted.38 Moreover, the government claimed that it still
did not know the details about Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps or the
whereabouts of Lashkar-e-Taiba‘s leaders due to Benkahla‘s false
testimony.39 For these reasons, the district court concluded that Benkahla‘s
false or intentionally misleading answers actually obstructed the
investigation.40 Accordingly, the court ruled that Benkahla qualified for the
terrorism enhancement under Section 3A1.4, which increased his offense
level from 26 to 32 and his criminal history category from Category I to
41
Category VI.
This ruling caused Benkahla‘s guideline range to jump
from 33 to 41 months in prison to 210 to 262 months in prison.42
Having determined the applicable sentencing range for Benkahla, the
district court examined whether a prison sentence within the range of 210 to
262 months served the goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).43 The court
retaliate against government conduct; and (B) is a violation of . . . [a list of enumerated
offenses].‘‖ Id. at 751–52 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006)) (alteration in original).
34. Id. at 760.
35. Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. (citing United States v. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. Va. 2005)).
37. Id. at 755. Testimony secured from some of those individuals led to convictions for
―specific terrorist acts in Australia, France, and England.‖ Id.
38. Id. One of those individuals, Ali Al-Timimi, was the leader Dar al-Arqam‘s violent
faction and was later convicted of solicitation to levy war against the United States. United States
v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). The other
individual, Ahmed Omar Abu-Ali, was under investigation for conspiracy to levy war against the
United States and to assassinate the President of the United States when Benkahla testified before
the grand jury. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
39. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Section 3553(a) provides that a court shall impose a sentence ―sufficient, but not
greater than necessary‖ to reflect the seriousness of the crime, promote respect for the law, punish
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concluded that Benkahla was the ―quintessential candidate for a downward
departure‖ under these criteria and reduced his sentence to 121 months.44
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered: (1) whether Benkahla‘s second
prosecution violated the collateral estoppel component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) whether the trial court
―admitted irrelevant or unduly prejudicial evidence regarding radical
Islamic terrorism;‖ (3) whether the trial court violated the Sixth
Amendment by applying Section 3A1.4‘s terrorism enhancement; and (4)
whether the trial court erred in concluding that sufficient evidence existed
to corroborate Benkahla‘s admissions and support the guilty verdict.45
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (―SRA‖), Congress
created the United States Sentencing Commission (the ―Commission‖) and
authorized it to promulgate mandatory guidelines to eliminate ―unwarranted
sentencing disparities.‖46 Following the Supreme Court of the United
States‘ ruling in United States v. Booker,47 a district court judge must
consult the advisory sentencing ranges in the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (the ―Guidelines‖), but may specifically tailor a
sentence based on other statutory concerns.48 On appeal, assuming the
lower court made a procedurally correct sentencing decision, an appellate

justly, deter adequately, protect the public from further crimes, and provide adequate training or
medical treatment to the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
44. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 759. The court stated that the Category IV range overrepresented the seriousness of Benkahla‘s criminal history because, outside of his conviction, he
had no criminal record and there was no evidence that he ever committed an illegal act. Id.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that ―[Benkahla‘s] likelihood of ever committing another crime is
infinitesimal.‖ Id.
45. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 306 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950
(2009). This Note focuses on Benkahla‘s claim that the district court should not have applied the
terrorism enhancement.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of both the
Commission and the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 374, 396–97 (1989) (holding that the use of the Commission to establish the United
States Sentencing Guidelines is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority and does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine).
47. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Booker Court declared that the United States Sentencing
Guidelines should be considered in formulating criminal sentences but they would be only
advisory, not mandatory, guidelines. See id. at 244–46 (concluding that the SRA provision that
made the Guidelines mandatory was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial,
and therefore had to be severed and excised from the SRA).
48. Id. at 245–46; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing the factors a district judge should
consider when imposing a sentence).
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court must then review the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard
with an eye toward ―substantive reasonableness.‖49
Although federal appellate courts have heard a number of Guidelines
cases since Booker,50 Benkahla represents the first time a district court
judge applied the Section 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement for an individual
convicted of obstructing justice.51 The issues in Benkahla are therefore best
understood by examining the legislative history of Section 3A1.4 and
offenses for which federal courts have found the terrorism enhancement
appropriate.52 It is also helpful to consider the court‘s discussion of
Section 3A1.4, Note 2 in United States v. Biheiri53 and the sentences
imposed in non-terrorism-related obstruction cases.54
A. Section 3A1.4 Establishes an Upward Sentencing Adjustment for
Offenses that Involve or Are Intended to Promote Federal Crimes
of Terrorism
Prior to 1995, the Guidelines did not include an enhancement for
conduct relating to terrorism offenses.55 In 1994, the Commission
promulgated Section 3A1.4 pursuant to authority granted by Congress in
Section 120004 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (―VCCA‖).56 Section 3A1.4 now requires a twelve-level increase in
offense level, to at least level thirty-two, and an increase in criminal history

49. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a
change in the Guidelines that expands a sentencing range for a particular crime is not an ex post
facto law because the Guidelines are merely advisory); United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d
1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that after the PROTECT Act amendment of 2003, prosecutors
possess the same discretion to file ―acceptance of responsibility‖ motions under § 3E1.1(b) as they
do ―substantial assistance‖ motions under § 5K1.1); United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1300
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a district court remains obligated to correctly calculate the
Guidelines range under the safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), and that Booker did not
render such calculation advisory).
51. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d, 530
F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).
52. See infra Part II.A–B.
53. 356 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2005) (mem.).
54. See infra Part II.C.
55. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1994).
56. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 526 (2008). The VCCA directed
the Commission to amend the Guidelines ―to provide an appropriate enhancement for any felony,
whether committed within or outside the United States, that involves or is intended to promote
international terrorism, unless such involvement or intent is itself an element of the crime.‖
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120004, 108
Stat. 1796, 2022. In 1996, the Commission amended § 3A1.4 to apply ―more broadly to ‗Federal
crimes of terrorism,‘ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g).‖ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL app. C, amend. 564 (2008).
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to Category VI for any felony ―that involved, or was intended to promote, a
federal crime of terrorism.‖57 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), a ―federal
crime of terrorism‖ is defined as ―an offense that . . . is calculated to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion,
or to retaliate against government conduct; and . . . is a violation of‖ one of
a list of federal criminal statutes.58
The Guidelines Manual breaks down the general procedure for
determining a sentence into a series of steps.59 After first determining the
total offense level and criminal history category under those steps, the
sentencing judge uses the Guidelines Sentencing Table to ascertain the
applicable guideline range.60 A district court may depart from this
guideline range and sentence a defendant outside that range if the court
finds ―that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines . . . .‖61
B. The Terrorism Enhancement Applies to a Variety of Federal
Offenses
Section 3A1.4 applies to a broad range of felonies,62 and operates even
when the defendant was not convicted of a ―federal crime of terrorism.‖63

57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2008). A criminal history Category VI
and offense level thirty-two produces a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2008) (Sentencing Table).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006). Application Note 1 of § 3A1.4 provides that ―‗federal
crime of terrorism‘ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).‖ U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2008).
59. For general sentencing application instructions, see the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2008). First, the sentencing judge must determine the applicable offense
guideline section in Chapter Two. Id. § 1B1.1(a). Next, the court selects the base-offense level
and ―appl[ies] any appropriate specific offense characteristics, cross references, and special
instructions contained in the particular guideline . . . .‖ Id. § 1B1.1(b). The sentencing court then
makes any adjustments to that base-offense level as warranted by adjustment factors. Id.
§ 1B1.1(b)–(c). When there are multiple counts of conviction, the preceding steps are repeated
for each count. Id. § 1B1.1(d). After the total offense level is determined, the court must calculate
the defendant‘s criminal history category. Id. § 1B1.1(f). The criminal history category number is
the sum of points given for each prior sentence the defendant has received. Id. § 4A1.1.
60. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2008) (Sentencing
Table).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
62. See id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (enumerating the specific offenses that Congress considers
―[f]ederal crime[s] of terrorism‖).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 997–98, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding that conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which
is not specifically enumerated in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), could serve as the basis for the terrorism
enhancement); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 3A1.4
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Indeed, as of June 2006, federal courts had convicted and sentenced 261
defendants on terrorism charges.64 One of the most publicized of these
convictions was in United States v. Lindh,65 in which the defendant, an
American citizen, pled guilty to supplying services to the Taliban
government in Afghanistan in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2, and 31 C.F.R. §§ 545.204 and 545.206(a), and to carrying an explosive
during the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).66
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, the parties agreed that the ―offense
involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism within
the meaning of . . . Section 3A1.4.‖67 The Lindh court determined that a
reduced sentence of twenty years was reasonable in part because the
defendant convincingly declared his opposition to terrorism, proclaiming
that he would not have joined the Taliban had he been fully informed about
that regime.68
Federal courts have also applied the terrorism enhancement to more
―traditional‖ cases of terrorism, such as highjacking, murder, and mass
destruction.69 For example, in United States v. Mandhai,70 the defendant
pled guilty to conspiring to use explosives to destroy buildings used in
interstate commerce.71 The Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant‘s
felony qualified for Section 3A1.4‘s sentencing enhancement because the
defendant intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism.72 In support of
its holding, the Mandhai court cited evidence that the defendant wanted to
bomb electrical power stations in retaliation for the United States
government‘s support of Israel and hoped that the resulting power outages

could be applied to a sentence for conviction of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371,
which is not mentioned in § 2332b(g)(5)(B)).
64. COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE
PAPER 14 (2006) [hereinafter COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER], available at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf.
65. 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002).
66. Id. at 566.
67. Id. at 569. The parties agreed that § 3A1.4 applied to the defendant‘s felony because ―the
Taliban's control of Afghanistan and the activities of those individuals fighting in support of the
Taliban provided protection and sanctuary to al Qaeda, a designated foreign terrorist
organization.‖ Id.
68. Id. at 571–72.
69. COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER, supra note 64, at 25.
70. 375 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 1246–47. Although the defendant in Mandhai was convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i), which specifically lists the destruction of buildings used in interstate commerce by fire or
explosives as a federal terrorism crime in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), conspiracy to commit the
same offense is not listed in the statute. Id. at 1247.
72. Id. at 1247–48.

Book_FinalBookProof

70

10/15/2009 12:49 PM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 68:61

would lead to civil strife throughout Miami.73 Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the sentence range of 188 to 235 months, resulting from
the twelve-level increase to the defendant‘s offense level under
Section 3A1.4, was disproportionate compared to the nature of the crime.74
On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 168 months, which the
Eleventh Circuit concluded was reasonable.75
Courts have also found that ―domestic terrorism‖ offenses committed
by American citizens disaffected from mainstream society are subject to
enhanced sentences under Section 3A1.4.76 Recently, in United States v.
Thurston,77 defendant Kevin Tubbs pled guilty in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon to acts of arson across five different states
and destruction of a high voltage electric tower.78 The defendant and others
committed these crimes, which demolished numerous buildings and
vehicles and caused tens of millions of dollars in damages, on behalf of the
Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front.79 At sentencing,
the defendant claimed that using the terrorism enhancement to calculate his
and his co-defendants‘ sentences ―contravene[d] congressional intent that
the Guidelines achieve fairness and avoid unwarranted disparities in
sentencing.‖80 The District of Oregon rejected this argument, stating that
―[i]f . . . the government is overreaching due to political considerations,
either the enhancement will not apply to defendants‘ offenses or defendants
will be eligible for a downward departure.‖81 Thus, the district court

73. Id. at 1246, 1248. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the defendant
intended his crime to influence government conduct. Id. at 1248.
74. Id. at 1249–50. In Mandhai, the defendant had conspired to destroy government buildings
by means of fire or explosives, had second thoughts about the conspiracy, and finally withdrew
after being confronted by government agents. Id. at 1250.
75. United States v. Mandhai, 179 F. App‘x 576, 577 (11th Cir. 2006).
76. COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER, supra note 64, at 59.
77. No. CR 06-60070-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176 (D. Or. May 21, 2007).
78. Id. at *1–*2.
79. Id. at *2. The district court explained that the defendants, including Tubbs, ―targeted
federal government agencies and private parties they believed responsible for degradation of the
environment, tree harvesting, and cruel treatment of animals.‖ Id.
80. Id. at *18. The defendants argued that the government had not sought the terrorism
enhancement in other Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front prosecutions related to
their case or in prosecution of persons who possessed biological toxins. Id.
81. Id. Moreover, the district court noted that ―the terrorism enhancement ha[d] been applied
in cases where far fewer or no acts of arson were committed.‖ See id. at *18–*19 (referencing
United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 2005), where the Fifth Circuit upheld the
application of the enhancement to a defendant who threw a Molotov cocktail into a municipal
building housing a police department; United States v. Dowell, 430 F.3d 1100, 1105, 1110 (10th
Cir. 2005), where the defendant who committed arson by pouring and igniting gasoline on an
Internal Revenue Service office received an enhanced sentence; and United States v. Mandhai,
375 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004)).
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concluded that the longer sentence the defendant would receive did not
render application of Section 3A1.4 disparate or unfair.82 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant‘s 151-month sentence.83
C. Application of the Terrorism Enhancement to the Offense of
Obstructing an Investigation of a Federal Crime of Terrorism
In Lindh, Mandhai, and Thurston, the application of Section 3A1.4
was fairly straightforward because each case involved defendants convicted
of committing or conspiring to commit violent acts of terrorism.84 There
are, however, a variety of less dangerous and less violent offenses to which
Section 3A1.4 also applies. Following the events of September 11, 2001,
Congress focused with renewed intensity on terrorism offenses and
expanded the scope of the terrorism enhancement to include crimes
involving the obstruction of justice. In response to the USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001,85 the Commission adopted Application Note 2 to Section 3A1.4,86
which provides that ―obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of
terrorism [is] considered to have involved, or to have been intended to
promote, that federal crime of terrorism.‖87
United States v. Biheiri is one of just three cases in which the
government requested that the court apply the terrorism enhancement for
―‗obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism.‘‖ 88 In
Biheiri, the government proved at trial that the defendant fraudulently
procured his naturalization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and made
false statements in his naturalization application in violation of 18 U.S.C.

82. Id. at *19.
83. United States v. Tubbs, 290 F. App‘x 66, 67–68 (2008).
84. See supra Part II.B.
85. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (―USA PATRIOT Act‖), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 803, 115 Stat.
272.
86. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (2008).
87. Id. § 3A1.4 cmt. n.2.
88. See United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 & n.3 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing
United States v. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), and United States v.
Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2005), as the only two cases before Benkahla in which the
government requested the enhancement under Note 2 of § 3A1.4). The Seventh Circuit‘s analysis
of Note 2 to § 3A1.4 provides little guidance because the facts of that case clearly established that
the defendant did not obstruct an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism. See Arnaout, 431
F.3d at 1003 (upholding the district court‘s refusal to apply the obstruction of justice terrorism
enhancement). Even though the defendant, who was the executive director of an alleged
humanitarian organization, made false statements that obstructed an investigation of aid to
military forces in Bosnia and Chechnya, that investigation was not concerned with the provision
of support to terrorists or terrorist organizations. Id. at 999, 1003.
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§ 1015(a).89 On three separate occasions, the government sought the
terrorism enhancement under Section 3A1.4, Application Note 2.90 On the
third attempt, the government argued that the defendant lied about his
relationship with an individual who was known to be affiliated with a
terrorist organization, thus obstructing a terrorist-financing investigation.91
Judge Thomas Ellis of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia first stated that 18 U.S.C. § 3553 requires sentencing
judges to consider various factors in determining whether a sentencing
range is appropriate, but emphasized that ―sentencing, in the end, must
involve the exercise of judgment.‖92 Later in its opinion, the district court
declared that the plain language of Section 3A1.4 clearly demonstrates that
a defendant must actually obstruct an investigation of a federal crime of
terrorism to receive the enhancement; a mere attempt to obstruct an
investigation is insufficient.93 As such, the district court found that the
defendant did not actually obstruct the investigation because the
interviewing federal agents knew that his statement regarding ties to a
known terrorist was false.94 Thus, the district court concluded that the
terrorism enhancement was unwarranted.95
While no court other than the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the
obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement, the Guidelines section for
non-terrorism-related obstruction of justice convictions has been applied
extensively by many courts. Obstruction of justice crimes are governed by
18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1520.96 Sentencing of defendants convicted under
those statutes mainly proceeds in accordance with Section 2J1.2 of the
Guidelines,97 which carries with it a base offense level of fourteen.98
Section 2J1.2(c) specifies that when a defendant‘s offense involves
obstructing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, the court
should cross-reference and apply Section 2X3.1.99 The base offense level
89. Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 598.
92. Id. at 594.
93. Id. at 598. The district court explained that unlike § 3C1.1—the general obstruction of
justice sentencing guideline—and 18 U.S.C. § 1503—the federal obstruction of justice statute—
which both punish attempts to obstruct, § 3A1.4 makes no mention of attempted obstruction. Id.
94. Id. at 600.
95. Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1520 (2006).
97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A, at 546 (2008).
98. Id. § 2J1.2(a). Where the defendant has a criminal history of Category I, the resulting
guideline range is fifteen to twenty-one months. Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
99. Id. § 2J1.2(c).
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for Section 2X3.1 is computed by subtracting six levels from the offense
level ―for the underlying offense,‖100 and is not to exceed thirty or fall
below four.101
Because Section 2J1.2(c) requires a sentencing court to cross-reference
Section 2X3.1 for cases in which a defendant obstructed an investigation or
prosecution of a criminal offense, the resulting sentences are longer than
those where Section 2X3.1 does not apply. For example, in United States v.
Crawford,102 the defendant, a Memphis attorney, pled guilty to obstructing
the prosecution of one of his clients for possessing a firearm after having
already been convicted of a felony.103 The court first applied Section 2J1.2
to the defendant‘s obstruction of justice charges and then considered
Section 2X3.1.104 The applicable Guidelines section for the client‘s
conduct was Section 2K2.1,105 which carried a base level offense of
twenty-four.106 The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court‘s application of
Section 2X3.1(a) to the defendant‘s sentence because the resulting offense
level of eighteen was greater than fourteen, the level attributable to an
obstruction of justice offense.107 The court ultimately sentenced the
defendant to seventy-one months imprisonment for obstructing justice.108
Similarly, in United States v. Bell,109 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois convicted the defendant of obstructing
justice after he refused to testify before a federal grand jury about a murder
that he and five other individuals committed.110 In applying Section 2X3.1,
the district court determined that the underlying offense committed by the
subject of the grand jury investigation was a racketeering charge under 18
U.S.C. § 1959.111 Because the most serious racketeering activity attributed
100. Id. § 2X3.1(a)(1). ―An [u]nderlying offense‖ is ―the offense as to which the defendant is
convicted of being an accessory.‖ Id. § 2X3.1 cmt. n.1.
101. Id. § 2X3.1(a)(2)–(3).
102. 281 F. App‘x 444 (6th Cir. 2008).
103. Id. at 446–47. The obstruction violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510(a) and 1512(c)(2). Id. at 446.
Specifically, the defendant obstructed justice by bribing two undercover police officers to get a
firearms charge against the defendant‘s client dismissed and by supplying an undercover police
officer with a pistol and two shipments of crack cocaine as part of an agreement to have one of the
defendant‘s fellow gang members murdered. Id. at 447–48.
104. Id. at 450.
105. Section 2K2.1 applied because the court found that unlawfully possessing a firearm was
the underlying crime. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 446.
109. No. 02 CR 51, 2002 WL 31804211 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2002) (mem.).
110. See id. at *1–*2. The defendant‘s actions in obstructing justice violated 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
Id. at *2.
111. Id. at *3.
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to the defendant was murder, the district court applied the second degree
murder offense level of thirty-three.112 Section 2X3.1 reduced the
defendant‘s offense level to twenty-seven and, with a Category IV criminal
history, the resulting guideline range was seventy-seven to ninety-six
months.113 The district court judge consequently sentenced the defendant
to ninety-six months in prison.114
Finally, in United States v. Quam,115 the defendant was convicted of
obstructing justice after she falsely told a grand jury that she knew nothing
about her live-in boyfriend‘s drug-trafficking activities.116 Although the
defendant would have had an offense level of fourteen under Section 2J1.2,
the district court also applied Section 2X3.1 because the defendant had
obstructed a criminal investigation.117
The underlying drug-charge
offense—possession of roughly 2.3 grams of methamphetamine and 111.5
grams of marijuana118—prescribed an offense level of twenty, from which
the district court subtracted six levels to arrive at the defendant‘s total
offense level of fourteen.119 The district court thereby imposed a mere
fifteen-month prison sentence, which was subsequently upheld by the
Eighth Circuit.120
III. THE COURT‘S REASONING
In United States v. Benkahla,121 the Fourth Circuit held that Benkahla
qualified for the terrorism enhancement under Section 3A1.4, and thus
affirmed the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia.122 Judge James Harvie Wilkinson, writing for the Fourth Circuit,
noted that the appellate court must ―‗review the sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard‘ with an eye toward both ‗procedural‘ and ‗substantive
reasonableness.‘‖123 After reviewing the language and legislative histories
112. Id. at *3–*4.
113. Id. at *4. In reaching this sentencing range, the district court reduced the defendant‘s total
offense level to twenty-four because he accepted responsibility for the crime. Id.
114. United States v. Jackson, No. 02 CR 52, 2003 WL 444459, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2003)
(mem.). The defendant in Bell actually received an effective sentence of just twenty-six months
because the district court judge ruled that the first seventy months would be served concurrently
with the defendant‘s related state sentence. Id. at *6.
115. 367 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2004).
116. Id. at 1007.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1007, 1009.
120. Id. at 1007.
121. 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).
122. Id. at 303.
123. Id. at 311 (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)).
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of Section 3A1.4 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(g)(5), the Fourth Circuit
determined that applying the terrorism sentencing enhancement in
Benkahla‘s case ―seem[ed] straightforward.‖124
First, Judge Wilkinson affirmed the district court‘s finding that the
investigation in which Benkahla was questioned was an investigation of a
federal crime of terrorism.125 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Benkahla
satisfied the second element of Section 2332b(g)(5) by obstructing a grand
jury investigating violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.126 The
Fourth Circuit rejected Benkahla‘s contention that the investigation in his
case was too general because the violations the government was
investigating involved specific jihadist camps training people to fight the
governments of India, Russia, and the United States.127 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the ―motivational element‖ of Section 2332b(g)(5)
was satisfied.128
Second, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the district court‘s
determination that the term ―obstructing‖ in Section 3A1.4 required actual
obstruction.129 Judge Wilkinson extensively quoted the district court‘s
factual findings, and found that Benkahla‘s falsehoods ―not only delayed
some parts of the investigation, but wholly frustrated others.‖130 In
conclusion, the Fourth Circuit stated that ―the terrorism enhancement is
doing just what it ought to do: Punishing more harshly than other criminals
those whose wrongs served an end more terrible than other crimes.‖131
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit approved the terrorism enhancement as
applied to Benkahla.132
IV. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Benkahla, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit upheld the United States District Court for the Eastern

124. Id. Judge Wilkinson rejected Benkahla‘s argument that Note 2 of Section 3A1.4
contradicted Section 3A1.4 itself because the language of the commentary and the Guidelines are
―identical in all material respects.‖ Id. at 312.
125. Id. at 313.
126. Id. at 311–12.
127. Id. at 313.
128. Id. at 312–13. The Fourth Circuit essentially reiterated the district court‘s analysis of the
motivational element. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
129. See Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 313 (―There is no need to review the district court‘s legal
conclusions. Whether those conclusions are correct or incorrect, the court‘s factual findings
clearly support applying the enhancement.‖).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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District of Virginia‘s application of the Section 3A1.4 terrorism sentencing
enhancement and found that a sentence of 121 months, after a downward
departure, was appropriate.133 The Fourth Circuit deferred entirely to the
district court, which had found that Benkahla qualified for the obstruction
of justice terrorism enhancement because he made false material
declarations to a grand jury, obstructed justice, and made false material
statements to the FBI, all in connection with the government‘s investigation
of terrorist groups and terrorist training camps. 134 The district court‘s
analysis of the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement, however,
disregarded both the nature and seriousness of Benkahla‘s offense and
principles of sentencing proportionality.135 Moreover, the district court‘s
interpretation of Section 3A1.4, Note 2 significantly dilutes the standard for
proving that the terrorism enhancement applies to an obstruction of justice
conviction.136 In effect, the district court‘s opinion did not properly
distinguish between an individual who directly promotes a federal crime of
terrorism and an individual who obstructs an investigation into a federal
crime of terrorism.137 Benkahla, therefore, represents an overzealous use of
the terrorism enhancement and indicates that the Commission needs to
reevaluate the scope and severity of Section 3A1.4‘s Note 2.
A. The Benkahla Court Diluted an Already Weak Framework for
Determining Applicability of the Obstruction of Justice Terrorism
Enhancement
Senior District Judge James C. Cacheris applied the obstruction of
justice terrorism enhancement in Benkahla despite recognizing that ―[t]he
[G]uidelines provide no guidance as to what constitutes ‗an investigation of
a federal crime of terrorism‘ and ‗obstructing‘ within the meaning of this
seemingly broad terrorism enhancement.‖138 Judge Cacheris‘s analysis,
which the Fourth Circuit subsequently endorsed, makes it significantly
easier for the government to prove that an obstruction of justice conviction
similar to Benkahla‘s warrants application of the terrorism enhancement.
In the first part of its analysis, the district court concluded that the
obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement should apply only when a
defendant obstructs investigations into specific terrorism offenses within a

133. Id. at 303, 305–06.
134. Id. at 303.
135. See infra Part IV.A–B.
136. See infra Part IV.A.
137. See infra Part IV.B–C.
138. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d, 530
F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).
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discrete set of facts.139 The requirement of an investigation into a
sufficiently specific offense limits the scope of ―an investigation of a
federal crime of terrorism‖ by making the enhancement inappropriate in the
context of ―general terrorism investigations or intelligence gathering.‖140
At the same time, however, it enables the government to prove that a
defendant‘s obstruction was ―calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
the government‖ merely by showing that a terrorism investigation focused
on specific facts, persons, and offenses.141 In other words, rather than
focusing on the individual‘s intent, the district court‘s evaluation of the
obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement shifts the focus to the nature of
the investigation. As a result, the prosecution in Benkahla had to prove
only that its terrorism investigation was sufficiently specific to satisfy 18
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)‘s ―motivational element‖—whether or not Benkahla
willfully intended to promote an act of terrorism was irrelevant.142
Second, in concluding that Benkahla‘s offense actually obstructed the
FBI and grand jury investigations,143 the district court appears to have
relaxed its own standard for determining what constitutes an obstruction of
justice under Section 3A1.4.144 In his discussion of the terrorism
enhancement‘s ―actual obstruction‖ requirement, Judge Cacheris found that
the FBI investigation in which Benkahla was questioned sought information
regarding (1) Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps, training techniques,
curriculum, and locations; (2) individuals who may have received training
at such camps; and (3) individuals believed to have aided others in
obtaining jihad training.145 Next, the court stated that the government ―did
139. Id. at 752.
140. Id.
141. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. The district court stated:
As to the motivation for his untruthfulness, this Court is unsure. Defendant may have
been motivated out of a desire not to be seen as involved with illegal activities. He may
have been concerned about potential hardship he might cause others. He may have
been embarrassed of his own conduct.
Id. at 760. The court also opined that a sentence of 210 months for making false statements
―without the intent to promote a crime of terrorism‖ is too harsh to achieve the goals set out in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Id. at 761.
143. Id. at 757.
144. In United States v. Biheiri, decided three years before Benkahla, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia ruled that § 3A1.4, Note 2 applies only if a defendant actually
obstructed an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism. 341 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. Va.
2005). The Biheiri Court ruled that the defendant‘s obstruction offense in that case did not satisfy
the enhancement‘s actual obstruction prong because the government was already aware of the
information that it sought. Id. at 600; see supra Part II.C.
145. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757. Before detailing the evidence related to the
government‘s investigation, the district court made the threshold observation that Benkahla‘s
conviction involved providing false or misleading statements. Id.
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not, and in some cases, still does not, possess the specific information
which it sought,‖ and thus concluded that Benkahla actually obstructed the
FBI‘s investigation.146
The district court‘s reasoning is flawed in that it fails to establish a
causal connection between Benkahla‘s false statements and the
government‘s lack of information on violent jihad. Specifically, if the
government did not know any details about Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps
or the identities of persons believed to have aided others in obtaining jihad
training, what was the court‘s factual basis for determining that, but for
Benkahla‘s obstruction, the government would have known those
details?147 Moreover, even if Benkahla lied during the 2004 grand jury and
FBI investigations regarding his relationships with certain individuals, there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding that those falsehoods ―not
only delayed some parts of the investigation, but wholly frustrated
others.‖148 In sum, the district court‘s reasoning, adopted by the Fourth
Circuit, suggests that the obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement
applies even in the absence of any evidence that a defendant‘s false
statements actually obstructed the investigation in which he was questioned.
Accordingly, enhancing Benkahla‘s sentence under Section 3A1.4 was
unjustifiable.
B. Application Note 2 of Section 3A1.4 Creates Inequitable Results
Because It Provides an Identical Guideline Range for Obstruction
146. Id.
147. See id. (―[B]ecause of Defendant‘s false or intentionally misleading answers, the
Government still does not know the identity or whereabouts of the persons about whom Defendant
was questioned, their involvement with Lashkar-e-Taiba, and their role in aiding persons to obtain
jihad training.‖). Indeed, this section of the district court‘s opinion failed to acknowledge that it
had acquitted Benkahla in 2004 on charges that he participated in a Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp
in the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text. Instead, the court observed that the government could not account for Benkahla for a mere
five days during his 1999 trip to South Asia. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
148. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008) (mem.), aff‟d, 530 F.3d 300
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009). The Fourth Circuit‘s assertion that
Benkahla‘s obstruction ―wholly frustrated‖ parts of the FBI‘s investigation directly contradicts the
district court‘s finding that ―the extent of [Benkahla]‘s actual obstruction was hardly devastating
to the [FBI‘s] investigation.‖ Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 760. The fact that the two primary
persons of interest to the FBI in its investigation were each convicted in 2005, despite Benkahla‘s
false declarations, substantiates the district court‘s findings. A jury convicted Ali al-Timimi in
April 2005 on various charges, including soliciting others to levy war against the United States,
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Benkahla, 530 F.3d at 303; News Release, Dep‘t of
Justice, Dep‘t of Justice Examples of Terrorism Convictions Since Sept. 11, 2001 (June 23, 2006).
In November 2005, a jury convicted Ahmed Omar Abu Ali of, among other violations, providing
material support to al Qaeda, conspiracy to assassinate the U.S. President, conspiracy to commit
air piracy, and conspiracy to destroy aircraft. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 225–26 (4th
Cir. 2008).
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Offenses and Offenses that Directly Involve a Federal Crime of
Terrorism
Benkahla marks the first time a federal court applied the terrorism
enhancement for obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of
terrorism.149 In contrast, numerous defendants have ―received similar or
even lesser sentences for significantly more severe, violent [terrorism]
offenses.‖150 Section 3A1.4 provides an appropriate punishment for those
defendants due to the seriousness of their crimes and the need to protect the
public.151 By broadening Section 3A1.4 to include the offense of
obstructing a terrorism investigation, however, the severity of the penalty
no longer fits the dangerousness of the crime.
The excessiveness of Benkahla‘s sentence is evidenced by comparing
his criminal conduct with the criminal conduct and respective sentences of
the defendants in Thurston, Mandhai, and Lindh. For instance, Benkahla‘s
sentence of 121 months is only thirty months less than that given to a
defendant who committed multiple acts of arson and destroyed a high
voltage electrical tower by fire.152 Similarly, Benkahla‘s sentence is only
forty-seven months less than the sentence given to a defendant who
conspired to bomb government buildings and recruited others to help carry
out the plot,153 and only eight years shorter than the sentence received by an
American citizen who fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan against United
States military forces.154 Moreover, in contrast to the defendants in these
cases, Benkahla did not commit or even attempt to commit any violent acts.
This renders incomprehensible the Fourth Circuit‘s declaration that ―the
terrorism enhancement is doing just what it ought to do: Punishing more
149. See Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 751 (―[N]o court has ever applied the enhancement for
‗obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism,‘ and in only two such cases has the
Government requested it.‖).
150. Id. at 761; see also supra Part II.B.
151. See Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 761–62 (discussing Benkahla‘s co-defendants who
―committed and were convicted of more dangerous and more violent offenses‖ than Benkahla, and
thus received enhanced sentences under § 3A1.4 that adequately served the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
152. See United States v. Tubbs, 290 F. App‘x 66, 67–69 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying § 3A1.4 to
an eco-terrorist convicted of arson and destroying an energy facility, and thus affirming the
sentencing court‘s imposition of a 151-month sentence following a downward departure).
153. See United States v. Mandhai, 179 F. App‘x 576, 576–77 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming a
168-month sentence, following a downward departure, for a defendant‘s felony offense of
involving or intending to promote federal crime of terrorism by conspiring to destroy buildings
affecting interstate commerce by means of fire or explosives).
154. See United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566, 573 (E.D. Va. 2002) (sentencing a
college-educated American citizen to twenty years in prison under § 3A1.4 after he pled guilty to
supplying services to the Taliban and to carrying an explosive while fighting on behalf of the
Taliban against United States soldiers in Afghanistan).
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harshly than other criminals those whose wrongs served an end more
terrible than other crimes.‖155 In reality, the obstruction of justice terrorism
enhancement—in terms of proportionality—is punishing more harshly
those who interfere with terrorism investigations than those who committed
the egregious acts themselves.
Finally, the district court rejected Benkahla‘s contention that
application of the terrorism enhancement was unfair and disparate in light
of his conduct on the grounds that a defendant will be eligible for a
downward departure in sentencing if Section 3A1.4 over-represents the
seriousness of his conduct.156 Although the court‘s decision to reduce
Benkahla‘s sentence seems appropriate, it further evinces that the 210- to
262-month guideline range under the obstruction of justice terrorism
enhancement is draconian. Similarly, granting undue discretion to
sentencing judges to depart from the guideline range is inconsistent with the
Guidelines‘ objective of equal treatment and coordinated sentencing among
the federal courts.157
C. Benkahla Illustrates that the Obstruction of Justice Terrorism
Enhancement Imposes a Disproportionate Sentence Range
Compared to the Advised Sentence Range for Obstructing an
Investigation of a Non-Terrorism Criminal Offense
The obstruction of justice terrorism enhancement is unequivocally
severe compared to the sentencing range for non-terrorism-related
obstruction of justice convictions.158 The district court‘s application of
Section 3A1.4 maximized Benkahla‘s criminal history to Category VI and
increased his offense level to thirty-two.159 As a result of this adjustment,
Benkahla‘s guideline range was 210 to 262 months.160 By comparison,
without judicial determination that the terrorism enhancement applied,

155. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950
(2009).
156. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 758–59 & n.7 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.),
aff‟d, 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009) (citing United States v.
Thurston, No. CR 06-60070-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176, at *18 (D. Or. May 21, 2007)).
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.2 (2008) (recommending a base
offense level of fourteen that, combined with a criminal history of Category I, renders a guideline
range of fifteen to twenty-one months), with id. § 3A1.4 (increasing a defendant‘s offense level to
thirty-two and criminal history to Category VI, which renders a guideline range of 210 to 262
months); see also id. ch. 5, pt. A.
159. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
160. Id.
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Benkahla‘s sentence would have been only thirty-three to forty-one months,
even taking into account Section 2X3.1.161
To appreciate how substantial this disparity is in light of the offense
committed, consider a hypothetical defendant who is convicted of the same
obstruction offense as Benkahla.162
Assume, however, that the
government‘s investigation was not actually obstructed because, although
the hypothetical defendant misled the grand jury and the government,
investigators were already aware of the information they sought prior to the
defendant‘s testimony.163 Assuming also that, like Benkahla, the defendant
has no prior criminal history and has engaged in model citizenry outside the
context of the instant case, the resulting guideline range would be fifteen to
twenty-one months.164 Under these circumstances, it is patently certain that
an appellate court would find unreasonable a sentence of 121 months, a
600% upward departure from the highest guideline range.165 None of the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors would support such an enhancement.166
A review of the sentences imposed on individuals who obstructed
investigations of serious crimes unrelated to acts of terrorism further
establishes the unreasonableness of Benkahla‘s 121-month sentence. Most
notably, Benkahla‘s sentence is an astounding 106 months longer than that
imposed on a defendant whose sentence was based on an underlying
offense of trafficking 111.5 grams of marijuana, 2.3 grams of
methamphetamine, and various other items associated with drug
trafficking.167 Benkahla‘s sentence was also fifty months greater than the

161. In Benkahla, the underlying crime that the government was investigating was providing
resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and
2339B, which carry a base offense level of twenty-six. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 754; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3 (2008). Under § 2X3.1, a defendant‘s base offense
level for obstruction of justice is set at six levels less than the offense level of the underlying
offense, netting an adjusted offense level of twenty. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2X3.1(a)(1). Because Benkahla had a criminal history of Category I, the resulting guideline
range would have been thirty-three to forty-one months. See id. ch. 5, pt. A. The district court in
Benkahla did not address the accessory after the fact guideline because the terrorism enhancement
increased the guidelines sentence to 210 to 262 months, regardless of whether the cross-reference
applied.
162. See Amici Curiae Br. of the Council on American-Islam Relations, and Muslim Am.
Soc‘y Freedom Found. in Supp. of the Appellant at 24, United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300
(4th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-4778).
163. See id.
164. See supra Part I and text accompanying note 98.
165. Amici Curiae Br. in Supp. of the Appellant at 25, Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300 (No. 07-4778).
166. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
167. See United States v. Quam, 367 F.3d 1006, 1007 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
imposition of a fifteen-month sentence for a defendant convicted of false declarations before a
grand jury and obstruction of justice, where the defendant actively participated in the selling of
Schedule I drugs and lied to investigators about her boyfriend‘s drug trafficking activities).
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sentence imposed on a defendant who obstructed the prosecution of his
client for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of two prior
violent felonies,168 and twenty-five months greater than the sentence
received by a defendant who refused to testify about the beating death of a
young woman where the defendant was a known participant.169
The underlying crimes in those cases were of a violent nature or
involved large quantities of potentially lethal drugs, yet the perpetrators of
those crimes received far lighter sentences than Benkahla. There is nothing
in the facts of Benkahla to suggest that a sentence of 121 months would
have been reasonable without the finding that the terrorism enhancement
applied. Indeed, all of the circumstances present in Benkahla that reflected
upon Section 3553(a) factors were mitigating rather than aggravating.170
According to the district court, Benkahla had absolutely no prior history of
criminal behavior, presented little risk of criminal recidivism, was a model
citizen, received a master‘s degree from The Johns Hopkins University,
volunteered as a national elections officer in local, state, and national
elections, and was a loving husband and father to his four-year-old son.171
The district court even declared that ―Sabri Benkahla is not a terrorist.‖172
Thus, applying the terrorism enhancement to make Benkahla‘s sentence
eighty months longer than the maximum sentence for a non-terrorismrelated obstruction of justice conviction violates principles of fundamental
fairness and sharply contradicts the intent of the Guidelines, which were
designed to promote uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.173
V. CONCLUSION
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia‘s analysis of the
sentencing issue in United States v. Benkahla is more than disappointing.
Confronted by the question of whether a defendant convicted of obstructing
justice qualified for the terrorism enhancement, the court begged the
question by replying that Benkahla‘s offense was made in connection with
the government‘s investigation of terrorism and thus warranted Section
168. See United States v. Crawford, 281 F. App‘x 444, 450–53 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that the
district court properly computed the defendant‘s seventy-one-month sentence when it applied
§ 2X3.1).
169. See United States v. Bell, No. 02 CR 51, 2002 WL 31804211, at *1–*4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,
2002) (sentencing the defendant to ninety-six months in prison based on the obstruction of justice
guideline § 2J1.2, and the underlying offense of second degree murder).
170. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 759 (E.D. Va. 2007) (mem.), aff‟d, 530
F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950 (2009).
172. Id.
173. See supra Part II.
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3A1.4‘s sharp sentencing increase.174 The sparsity of the court‘s analysis is
particularly troubling because Benkahla‘s offenses neither directly involved
nor were intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism, and Benkahla
did not share the same characteristics or conduct of a typical terrorist.175 In
addition, the district court‘s discussion of Section 3A1.4, Application Note
2‘s ―actual obstruction‖ requirement is ineffectual because it does not show
any link between Benkahla‘s obstruction and the government‘s inability to
gather information about suspected terrorists and terrorist groups.176 The
Fourth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the district court‘s decision, averring,
―[t]here is no need to review the district court‘s legal conclusions‖ because
―[a]ll the evidence indicates‖ that Benkahla lied about his association with
violent jihad and terrorism.177
Benkahla also illustrates the need to reform the obstruction of justice
terrorism enhancement. The Guidelines are supposed to promote an
objective sentencing system that eliminates unwarranted sentencing
disparity.178 Yet, in comparing the sentences imposed on persons who
committed dangerous and violent offenses to Benkahla‘s 121-month
sentence, the disparity is staggering.179 For these reasons, the Sentencing
Commission must provide a standard definition for ―obstructing an
investigation of a federal crime of terrorism‖ and reevaluate the severity of
Section 3A1.4, Application Note 2‘s enhancement. To do otherwise would
be a complete disregard of principles of proportionality and fundamental
fairness.

174.
175.
176.
177.
(2009).
178.
179.

See supra Part I.
See supra Parts I and IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 950
See supra Part II.
See supra Parts IV.B–C.
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APPENDIX
United States Code
18 U.S.C. § 2332b. Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries
(g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—
(5) the term ―Federal crime of terrorism‖ means an offense
that—
(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct; and
(B) is a violation of—
(i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft
facilities), 37 (relating to violence at international airports), 81
(relating to arson within special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons), 175c
(relating to variola virus), 229 (relating to chemical weapons),
subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 351 (relating to
congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and
kidnapping), 831 (relating to nuclear materials), 832 (relating to
participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats
to the United States)[,] 842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic
explosives), 844(f)(2) or (3) (relating to arson and bombing of
Government property risking or causing death), 844(i) (relating to
arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce),
930(c) (relating to killing or attempted killing during an attack on
a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1) (relating to
conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad),
1030(a)(1) (relating to protection of computers), 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii)
through (v) (relating to protection of computers), 1114 (relating
to killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the
United States), 1116 (relating to murder or manslaughter of
foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected
persons), 1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1361 (relating to
government property or contracts), 1362 (relating to destruction
of communication lines, stations, or systems), 1363 (relating to
injury to buildings or property within special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States), 1366(a) (relating to
destruction of an energy facility), 1751(a), (b), (c), or (d) (relating
to Presidential and Presidential staff assassination and
kidnapping), 1992 (relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of
violence against railroad carriers and against mass transportation
systems on land, on water, or through the air), 2155 (relating to
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destruction of national defense materials, premises, or utilities),
2156 (relating to national defense materials, premises, or
utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation),
2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332
(relating to certain homicides and other violence against United
States nationals occurring outside of the United States), 2332a
(relating to use of weapons of mass destruction), 2332b (relating
to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries), 2332f
(relating to bombing of public places and facilities), 2332g
(relating to missile systems designed to destroy aircraft), 2332h
(relating to radiological dispersal devices), 2339 (relating to
harboring terrorists), 2339A (relating to providing material
support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material
support to terrorist organizations), 2339C (relating to financing of
terrorism), 2339D (relating to military-type training from a
foreign terrorist organization), or 2340A (relating to torture) of
this title;
(ii) sections 92 (relating to prohibitions governing atomic
weapons) or 236 (relating to sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122 or 2284);
(iii) section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy) . . . or section
60123(b) (relating to destruction of interstate gas or hazardous
liquid pipeline facility) of title 49; or
(iv) section 1010A of the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (relating to narco-terrorism).
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006).
United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 3A1.4. Terrorism
(a) If the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to
promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if
the resulting offense level is less than level 32, increase to level
32.
(b) In each such case, the defendant‘s criminal history category
from Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood)
shall be Category VI.
Commentary
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Application Notes:
1. “Federal Crime of Terrorism” Defined.—For purposes of this
guideline, “federal crime of terrorism” has the meaning given
that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).
2. Harboring, Concealing, and Obstruction Offenses.—For
purposes of this guideline, an offense that involved (A) harboring
or concealing a terrorist who committed a federal crime of
terrorism (such as an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2339 or
§ 2339A); or (B) obstructing an investigation of a federal crime
of terrorism, shall be considered to have involved, or to have
been intended to promote, that federal crime of terrorism.
3. Computation of Criminal History Category.—Under
subsection (b), if the defendant‟s criminal history category as
determined under Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal
Livelihood) is less than Category VI, it shall be increased to
Category VI.
4. Upward Departure Provision.—By the terms of the directive
to the Commission in section 730 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the adjustment provided by
this guideline applies only to federal crimes of terrorism.
However, there may be cases in which (A) the offense was
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct but the offense involved, or was intended to promote, an
offense other than one of the offenses specifically enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B); or (B) the offense involved, or was
intended to promote, one of the offenses specifically enumerated
in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), but the terrorist motive was to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, rather than to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. In such
cases an upward departure would be warranted, except that the
sentence resulting from such a departure may not exceed the top
of the guideline range that would have resulted if the adjustment
under this guideline had been applied.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007).

